Extra-Territorial Jurisdiction of Courts of Chancery by Levin, Charles
Notre Dame Law Review
Volume 9 | Issue 4 Article 3
5-1-1934
Extra-Territorial Jurisdiction of Courts of Chancery
Charles Levin
Follow this and additional works at: http://scholarship.law.nd.edu/ndlr
Part of the Law Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by NDLScholarship. It has been accepted for inclusion in Notre Dame Law Review by an
authorized administrator of NDLScholarship. For more information, please contact lawdr@nd.edu.
Recommended Citation
Charles Levin, Extra-Territorial Jurisdiction of Courts of Chancery, 9 Notre Dame L. Rev. 399 (1934).
Available at: http://scholarship.law.nd.edu/ndlr/vol9/iss4/3
EXTRA-TERRITORIAL JURISDICTION OF COURTS
OF CHANCERY
Do courts of chancery have power to issue decrees against
non-resident defendants or where the res of the action lies in
another state?
An interesting problem presents itself in the matter of
equity courts assuming jurisdition and rendering injunctive
or other relief where either the property in litigation, the
property right claimed violated, or the defendant, is outside
the jurisdiction of the court.
The development of the law in such cases, as will be seen,
arises from the theory of the "in personam" powers of the
equity courts. In most cases, with the exception of one or
two, the defendant has been personally served with process
within the jurisdiction of the court and consequently has
been amenable to the decrees of the court. There has been at
least one instance where no service at all was obtained on
one of the defendants, and yet a decree was rendered
against it.1
Out of the maze of jurisdictional questions, there has been
established a few basic and well-defined principles which are
now being followed in most states and in England. Most
well settled of these principles is the power of a court of
equity to decree equitable remedies with reference to real
estate or lands outside of the jurisdiction of the court.
These remedies include specific performance,' reconvey-
ance of lands fraudulently obtained,3 enforcement of a trust
relation," and, in some jurisdictions, bills to quiet title. The
I Montgomery Enterprises v. Empire Theater Company, 204 Ala. 566, 86 So.
880, 19 A. L. R. 987 (1920).
2 Farley v. Shippen, 1 Wythe 254 (1794); Guerrant v. Fowler, 1 Hen. &
M. 5 (1806). See also Hughes v. Hall, 5 Munf. 431 (1817).
3 Gardner v. Ogden, 22 N. Y. 327 (1860).
4 Prudential Ins. Co. v. Berry, 153 S. C. 496, 151 S. E. 63 (1930).
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courts regard the actions as being strictly "in personam" in
nature, and it has long been the rule that so long as the
parties are before the court, it is incidental that the lands
are situated outside of the state or in some other jurisdiction.
Perhaps the leading case on this subject is that of Penn v.
Lord Baltimore.' The action was brought in a court of
England to compel specific performance of certain articles
setting the boundaries of the colonies of Maryland and
Pennsylvania. The defendant contested the jurisdiction of
the court stating that it was a question for the American
courts to decide and not one of England. But Lord Hardwick
granted the bill and stated:
"The conscience of the party was bound by this agreement, and
being within the jurisdiction of this court, which acts in personam, the
court may properly decree it is an agreement, if there is a foundation
for it."
The decision of the English court was again followed in
the case of Ardglasse (Earl of) v. Muschamp.6 In this case
the plaintiff in England sought relief from a rent charge made
upon lands in Ireland on the ground that the same was
obtained by fraud. The defendant contested the jurisdiction
of the English courts inasmuch as the lands were in Ireland.
Lord Nottingham granted relief on the principle that it was
an "in personam" action and so it was incidental that the
lands were not within the jurisdiction of the court.
In this country a similar rule has been well-established.
Perhaps the most frequently cited case is that of Massie v.
Watts,7 wherein a bill was filed in a circuit court of Kentucky
to compel the defendant to convey lands obtained from the
plaintiff by fraud. The lands were situated in Ohio. Relief
was granted and an appeal was taken to the United States
5 1 Ves. Sr. 444 (1750). Accord: Earl of Derby v. Duke of Athol, 1 Ves.
Sr. 202 (1748); Lord Cranstown v. Johnson, 3 Ves. Jr. 170 (1796); Lord Por-
tarlington v. Soulby, 3 My. & K. 104 (1834).
6 1 Vern. 237 (1684).
7 6 Cranch 148, 3 L. Ed. 181 (1810).
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Supreme Court. Chief Justice Marshall affirmed the decision
of the lower court, and in an often repeated statement said:
".... where the defendant in the original action is liable to the plain-
tiff, either in consequence of a contract, or as trustee, or as the holder
of a legal title acquired by any species of mala fides practiced on the
plaintiff, the principles of equity give a court jurisdiction wherever
the person may be found, and the circumstance that a question of
title may be involved in the inquiry, and may even constitute the es-
sential point on which the case depends, does not seem sufficient to
arrest that jurisdiction."
The principle set out in this case was indicated in Gardner
v. Ogden,8 an early case in New York. The complaint therein
was also that the defendant had fraudulently obtained title
to the plaintiff's lands situated in Illinois. The plaintiff
sought a reconveyance of the lands from the defendants,
which was granted by a decree of the court. The court held
that where equity has jurisdiction of both parties it may
compel them to do equity in relation to lands located outside
of its jurisdiction and render a decree ordering the defendant
to reconvey the lands.'
So it appears that, on the theory that the decree is "in
personam," it is not always necessary that the res be located
in the state in which the decree is rendered. The distinction
is made in Taylor v. Taylor,"0 where it was held that a court
of one state cannot make a decree affecting title to real prop-
erty beyond its territorial limits, but, however, that such a
court can make a decree relative to the acts of the litigants
in relation to the property, and of course, in such event, it is
of minor importance where the situs of the property may be.
The court renders its decree and the parties themselves effect
the transfer of the property, and failing to do so, stand in
contempt of the court.
8 Op. cit. supra note 3.
9 See Newton v. Bronson, 3 Kernan 387, 13 N. Y. 587 (1856), holding:
"The doctrine established is that the Court of Chancery, having jurisdiction of
the person of the defendant, will, by its process of injunction and attachment,
compel him to do justice by the execution of such conveyances and assurances
as will effect the title of the property in the jurisdiction in which it is situated."
10 192 Cal. 71, 218 Pac. 756 (1923).
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It is undisputed that if the title of the lands is directly
affected, such lands must be within the jurisdiction of the
court.1 ' Again, referring to the theory of "in personam," a
court of equity would be without jurisdiction to render a
decree that would effect a transfer of title on lands situated
without its jurisdiction. But in cases of decrees compelling
reconveyances, specific performance, injunctions and other
remedies commonly sought, the title is affected indirectly
and it is in these instances that the courts have authority to
exercise extra-territorial jurisdiction in their decrees. 2
Of more interest and conflict, however, are cases that do
not involve real property but pertain to personal property,
personal rights, or acts outside of the jurisdiction of the
court, where the parties are before the court. Most common
among these are bills to prevent a party from going outside
of the state to institute suit, and bills to enjoin trespasses
from being committed on lands in other states. In these types
of cases the act sought to be enjoined is clearly outside the
jurisdiction of the court, and the offense, if there be any, is
an offense against the laws of the foreign state, and not of
the state in which the court granting the decree has juris-
diction.
Touching upon the former of the two above mentioned
common complaints, the case of Royal League v. Kava-
naugh 13 is of comparative recency. Therein the plaintiff, an
insurance company, sought to enjoin the defendant, a resi-
dent of Illinois, from going into the state of Missouri to
institute its suit, on the grounds that the laws of that state
were more favorable to the defendant in its contemplated
litigation. Injunctive relief was denied on the ground that it
could not be assumed that the laws of the state of Missoui
were different from those in Illinois, or in any manner un-
1 Bevans v. Murray, 251 Ill. 603, 96 N. E. 546 (1911).
12 See Israel S. Gomborov, Extra-Territorial Jurisdiction in Equity (1933)
7 Temple Law Qr. 468.
13 233 Ill. 175, 84 N. E. 178 (1908).
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just; and that the plaintiff's case presented no clear equity
that would require the interference of the court to prevent a
manifest wrong or injustice. But it is of interest to note that
the question of jurisdiction was not raised, and that if the
plaintiff had had an equitable claim the court would have
granted the injunction.
It is generally conceded that where the parties are citizens
of the same state and the plaintiff seeks to prosecute a suit
against the defendant debtor in another state merely to
evade the laws of the state in which both parties are citizens,
equity will enjoin the prosecution of such a suit. 4 Thus in
Wilson v. Joseph "5 the court restrained the defendant from
prosecuting an attachment proceeding in the courts of
another state, merely in order to evade the exemption laws
of the state of Indiana. But in cases of this type it must be
shown that an infringment, violation, or an unconscionable
act is being committed, for otherwise the courts will not
assume jurisdiction. So where a party brought suit in another
state because the statute of limitations was greater in dura-
tion in the foreign state and whereas the statute had already
run in the state wherein the parties resided, the court refused
to restrain the proceedings.' 6 Nor will the courts of one
state enjoin the prosecution of an action in a sister state upon
the sole ground that the foreign courts have established
erroneous rules of law.17
The distinction is made, therefore, that where a citizen
seeks to evade the laws of the state wherein he resides for the
purpose of obtaining or gaining an unfair advantage of his
adversary, equity will grant relief. But the rule has worked
14 See Dinsmore v. Nereshcimer, 32 Hun 204 (1884); Sandage v. Stude-
baker Mfg. Co., 142 Ind. 148, 41 N. E. 380 (1895); Snook v. Snetzer, 25 Ohio
516 (1874); Keyser v. Rice, 47 Md. 203 (1877); Dehon v. Foster, 86 Mass. 545
(1862).
15 107 Ind. 490, 8 N. E. 616 (1886).
16 Thorndike, Adm'r., v. Thorndike, 142 Ill. 450, 32 N. E. 510 (1892).
17 Carson v. Dunham, 149 Mass. 52, 20 N. E. 312 (1889); Cable v. Life
Ins. Co., 191 U. S. 288, 48 L. Ed. 188 (1903); Thorndike, Adm'r., v. Thorndike,
op. cit. supra note 16; 1 High on Injunctions 121.
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the other way around, and equity will also intervene in
behalf of a creditor to prevent the debtor from going into
another state in order to defeat the collection of a judgment
belonging to such creditor.'"
In Kirdahi v. Basha '" the plaintiff obtained a judgment
in the city court of the city of New York against the defen-
dant, Abraham Bechewati, who afterward, in order to evade
execution, mortgaged his property, located in New Jersey,
to the defedant, Basha. This action was brought in equity
to set aside the transfer made in New Jersey and to enjoin
Bechewati from alienating or incumbering the property
pending the action in the New Jersey courts to obtain satis-
faction of the judgment out of the land in that state. The
court granted the injunction on the grounds that it was
equitable to do so, and that it had jurisdiction even though
the land mortgaged was outside the territory of the court's
jurisdiction. The court relied on the decisions in Gardner v.
Ogden 20 and Penn v. Lord Baltimore.2
It can thus be seen that courts of equity have gone far in
the exercise of their powers to control litigation and the acts
of persons over whom they have jurisdiction, in order to
restrain them from taking unfair advantage over each other
merely because the acts or offenses committed are outside of
the court's jurisdiction. In most cases, the courts are able
to exercise such powers because the parties are before them.
There has been a case where a court of equity restrained a
defendant in a foreign state, on whom no service was ever
perfected, either personally or by notice, from violating an
agreement with the plaintiff, a resident of the state, for the
exclusive display of motion pictures. The court issued the
decree on the ground that it had jurisdiction over a nonresi-
dent, where the suit concerned an interest in personal prop-
18 ' Kirdaha v. Bosha, 74 N. Y. S. 383 (1902).
19 Op. cit. supra note 18.
20 Op. cit. supra note 3.
21 Op. cit. supra note 5.
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erty within the state, or where the act on which the suit was
started was to have been performed within the state.22 This
decision may be criticized, however, on the ground that the
defendant was never served with process or notice, and hence
was never before the court; that a decree of the court would
therefore not be binding on the defendant, and that a viola-
tion of such decree could not strictly be held to be contempt
of court.23 These cases illustrate how far equity courts have
gone in the matter of territorial jurisdiction over litigation.
There is the second matter of equity courts exercising jur-
isdiction over persons committing trespasses outside the ter-
ritorial limits of the courts. The leading and most often cited
cases on this subject are the Salton Sea Ccses.24  Therein
the plaintiff, a resident of California, sought to enjoin the
defendant, a resident of New Jersey, from diverting waters
from the California River, causing the lands of the plaintiff
in Utah to be overflowed. The diverting occurred in Mexico.
The action was originally brought in the California courts,
but subsequently was transferred to the Federal courts. Re-
lief was granted. The court held that although it was true
that an equity court had no jurisdiction to compel a defend-
ant to do anything beyond the territorial limit of the court,
especially where the property injured was outside of the jur-
isdiction of the court, yet, as long as the defendant is amena-
ble to the court's power, the above principle is inapplicable
since it would serve to frustrate justice. The person on
whom the court must act is within its control and it can
therefore restrain such person from committing such acts as
are inequitable or in violation of the principles of equity.
22 Montgomery Enterprises v. Empire Theatre Company, op. cit. supra note 1.
23 See State ex rel. Hog Haven Farms v. Pearcy, 41 S. W. (2d) 403 (Mo.
1931), holding that a court of equity is without powei to enjoin a nonresident
from maintaining a nuisance outside the state, where the defendant has not been
served personally or appeared before the court. But in Kempson v. Kempson,
61 N. J. Eq. 303, 48 Ati. 244 (1901), the New Jersey court restrained a husband
in New York from proceeding with a divorce suit in North Dakota. Service on
the husband was obtained by mail.
24 172 Fed. 792 (1909).
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It is to be noted that the basis of the rule applied by the
United States Supreme Court is two theories of extra-terri-
torial jurisdiction. The first was that laid down in the case
of Massie v. Watts.25 The second was the principle that in
criminal cases, although the crime be committed across a
boundary, the criminal is nevertheless subject to the power
of the court in the jurisdiction where the act took place. But
notwithstanding the theory of the court in Massie v. Watts,
there are a great number of cases that follow the precedent
of the Supreme Court rule, although none have made men-
tion of the principles upon which the case was decided.
Illinois has a complex situation with reference to the par-
ticular subject. The earliest decision in the matter of extra-
territorial jurisdiction to prevent trespasses was that of
Western Union Telegraph Co. v. Pacific and Atlantic Tele-
phone Co.,28 decided in 1868. This was an injunction to
restrain the defendants from attaching their wires to plain-
tiff's poles, extending from Chicago into the state of Indiana.
The injunction was granted in the lower court, but was
reversed on appeal. The court held as follows:
"The jurisdiction of our courts is only coextensive with the limits
of our State. They cannot legally send their process into "other states
and jurisdictions for service. If the exercise of such a jurisdiction were
attempted, and an injunction granted, and it should be disobeyed by
persons in Indiana, this court would be powerless to enforce the in-
junction by attachment, and hence the effort to exercise such a power
would be defeated. But we are of the opinion that neither the law nor
comity between distinct state or national organizations, sanctions the
authority of one such body to exercise jurisdiction over the citizens and
their property, which both are beyond the jurisdiction of the tribunal
in which the proceeding is pending. The courts of this State cannot
restrain the citizens of another state, who are beyond the limits of
this State, from performing acts in another state, or elsewhere outside
of, and beyond the boundary lines of this State. Any other practice
would lead to a conflict of jurisdiction."
25 Op. cit. supra note 7.
26 49 Ill. 90 (1868).
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This decision seemed to be in line with the criticism of
Poole v. Koons 2, by Professor Henry Schofield of North-
western University.2" In that case an Illinois chancery court
granted a bill for specific performance to compel the defend-
ant to convey lands in Arkansas. Professor Schofield was in-
clined to feel that the master's deed issued by the chancery
court was "so much waste paper," and cited the case of Fall
v. Eastin 29 in his criticism. It cannot be discerned whether he
objects to the issuance of a deed by a master or the assump-
tion of jurisdiction by the court although it seems to be the
former that is concerned. It is apparently well-estblished in
this country that, on the theory that the action is purely
one in personam, and not in rem, a court does have equitable
power to make such an order."0 It may be admitted, how-
ever. that the validity of a master's deed in such cases, in
states where it is authorized by statute, is a nice question,
especially for the courts of the jurisdiction where the prop-
erty is situated.
But Illinois has subsequently granted equitable relief in
cases where the trbspass is committed outside of the state.,
The most outstanding case is Alexander v. Tolleston Club."'
This was a bill for an injunction to restrain the defendant
from interfering with the complainant in the use of a certain
canal and footpath along its bank, in respect of which the
'complainant claimed a right of way. The land was located
in Indiana, the dispute arising out of a construction of a
lease. The court held that it had jurisdiction; that on the
well-settled principle that courts can grant specific perform-
ance of contracts respecting lands situated beyond the juris-
diction of the state where suit was brought, it could also
restrain persons from committing trespasses in such foreign
27 252 II1. 49, 96 N. E. 556 (1911).
28 6 IH. Law Rev. 545.
29 215 U. S. I, 54 L. Ed. 65 (1909).
30 Hart v. Sanson, 110 U. S. 151, 28 L. Ed. 101 (1883).
31 110 IRI. 65 (1884).
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jurisdiction where the right of a citizen of the state was
violated. In the language of the court:
"The fact that the property which is the subject of the matter in
controversy is located in a foreign country, will not prevent the court
from exercising jurisdiction, where all the parties to the transaction
are within its jurisdiction and amenable to its process."
In line with this case is that of Great Falls Manufacturing
Company v. Worster12 Here the plaintiff sought to enjoin
the defendant from interfering with its dam, which was
partly in Maine and partly in New Hampshire (the state in
which suit was brought). The defendant contested the juris-
diction of the court to restrain it from going into another
state and there committing trespass. However, the court
granted the injunction on the theory that it would be a
great injustice to be done merely because the property was
outside of the state. Wherever done, the injustice would still
remain as such, and the court has the power to issue injunc-
tions to prevent injustices.
In connection with these trespass cases, it might be of
interest to note what authority the courts will exercise where
the title of the land is in dispute. The case of Columbia
National Sand Dredging Company v. Morton 33 involves this
point. Here the plaintiff in New York sought to enjoin the
defendant in Virginia from removing sand and gravel from
the shore adjoining its land in Delaware. The defendant
contended that the gravel and sand were removed from the
river by virtue of a grant from the Secretary of War. The
plaintiff contested this and claimed that the land was accre-
tion. The injunction was granted in the lower court but the
upper court reversed this decision. It held that the court had
no jurisdiction because the dispute involved title to the prop-
erty in question; and that the matter was one of accretion to
land and was for the law courts to determine. This seems
32 23 N. H. 462 (1851).
33 28 App. D. C. 288, 7 L. R. A. (N. S.) 114 (1906).
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to be the rule; " but recently there seems to be a tendency
to grant a temporary injunction until the litigants have had
an opportunity to have the issue of title determined by a
common law court.35 It would therefore seem that in the case
involved, the court should have at least sustained a tempo-
rary injunction until the question of accretion had been de-
termined, inasmuch as it had already indicated that it had
assumed jurisdiction, but that it could not issue a decree as
long as the question of title was involved.
Thus the courts have spoken on the matter of issuing
equitable decrees and affording equitable relief on nonjuris-
dictional matters. However, there are a few jurisdictions
that do not recognize these principles and have held that a
chancery court is without any power whatsoever to extend
its jurisdiction beyond the confines of the state. In a recent
work on the Law of Injunctions, by Lewis and Spelling, the
authors have this to say on the question:
"Jurisdiction to grant and enforce injunctions does not extend be-
yond the state in which the application is made. Jurisdiction is only
coextensive with the limits of the state. State courts cannot legally
send their process into other states. If the exercise of such jurisdic-
tion were attempted, and an injunction granted to operate in another
state and it should be disobeyed by persons in the other state, the
court would be powerless to enforce the injunction by attachment,
and hence the effort to exercise such power would be readily de-
feated." 36
This same line of argument was used in the case of Arm-
strong v. Kinsell,37 where the plaintiff sought to restrain a
nonresident defendant from negotiating two notes given for
certain goods. The plaintiff alleged false representation and
breach of warranty. Service was obtained by notice; and on
34 Herman v. Mexican Petroleum Corp., 85 N. J. Eq. 367, 96 AUt. 492
(1915); Bicking v. Florey's Brick Works, 53 Pa. Super. Ct. 358 (1913).
35 Waterloo Mining Co. v. Doe, 82 Fed. 45 (1897).
36 At p. 19.
37 164 N. C. 175, 80 S. E. 235 (1913). Accord: Howard v. Berryman, 288
Pac. 605, 69 A. L. R. 1035 (1930).
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a special appearance, the court sustained the defendant's
motion to dismiss the action on the ground of "no service,"
saying:
". .. an injunction as to a nonresident is improvident, for it can
have no effect, usually at least, except in persona."
These rulings, which are in the minority, are mainly based
upon the proposition that it is useless for an equity court
to render a decree against a nonresident, for if he should fail
to obey it, and though he would therefore be in contempt of
the court in such event, that court would be without power
to punish him as long as he remained outside of its
jurisdiction.
But this is a case of "putting the cart before the horse."
No court of equity should anticipate in advance that its
decrees will be disobeyed, nor should they expect a disobey-
ance merely because the person against whom the decree is
issued is outside of the state. There are thousands of com-
monlaw cases wherein judgments are rendered upon which
there is no hope of a present monetary recovery, even at the
time that the judgment is rendered. Yet a common law court
certainly would not refuse to render a judgment merely be-
cause it may know of its own knowledge that the judgment
cannot be recovered or that a levy would not bring any
results.
Therein, the holding of the North Carolina court falls
short. It is not within the purview of a court to consider the
outcome of its findings in advance and whether or not they
are enforceable or will be obeyed. If an equity court has
the parties before it, it should consider them permanently in
court, without regard to the fact that the defendant may
escape punishment for violating the court's decree, by locat..
ing himself outside of the court's jurisdiction.
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In summarizing, it therefore appears that an equity court
can assume jurisdiction in matters and over defendants for-
eign to its jurisdiction where an unconscionable wrong is
done and where the litigation involves matters in personam.
It further appears that all that is necessary is that the
parties be before the court, and the fact that the res of the
matter in litigation is located in another state does not de-
prive the court of jurisdiction. Of course, it is assumed that
the case has all the elements and requirements necessary to
bring it within the scope of equity, and if all these are pres-
ent, there is no clear reason why relief should not be granted.
Charles Levin.
Hammond, Indiana.
